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Abstract	  
In	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  financial	  crisis,	  budgetary	  discipline	  has	  taken	  centre	  stage	  in	  politics.	  More	  than	  
ever	   a	   country's	   budget	  mirrors	   the	   true	   policy	   preferences	   of	   the	   legislative	  majority	   beyond	   all	  
political	  discourse	  and	  cheap	  talk.	  The	  paper	  sheds	  light	  on	  mandate	  fulfilment	  in	  the	  field	  of	  public	  
spending	  and	  fiscal	  policy	  in	  general.	  
Based	   on	   previous	   work	   on	   pledge	   fulfilment	   in	   Switzerland	   (Schwarz	   et	   al.	   2010	   and	   Fivaz	   et	   al.	  
2014)	   the	   paper	   compares	   publicised	  pre-­‐electoral	   statements	   of	  MPs	  on	  public	   spending	   and	   the	  
development	   of	   the	   public	   finances	   with	   their	   post-­‐electoral	   legislative	   behaviour	   during	   budget	  
debates	   and	   votes.	   The	   findings	   of	   the	   paper	   confirm	   the	   results	   of	   the	   aforementioned	   earlier	  
studies	  and	  point	  to	  the	  potential	  of	  budgetary	  statements	  for	  future	  mandate	  fulfilment	  research.	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1.	  Introduction	  
This	   paper	   addresses	   pledge	   fulfilment	   regarding	   public	   spending	   of	   members	   of	   the	   Swiss	  
parliament	   (MPs).	  With	   the	  sole	   focus	  on	  budgetary	  matters	  we	  enter	  uncharted	  territory	   to	  some	  
degree.	  
The	   idea	   to	   focus	   on	   the	   budget	   is	   not	   new.	   The	   saying	   “money	   makes	   the	   world	   go	   round”	   is	  
generally	  known.	  In	  German	  this	  saying	  is	  even	  more	  accurate	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  topic	  of	  this	  paper:	  
“Geld	   regiert	   die	   Welt”	   (“money	   governs	   the	   world”).	   A	   study	   on	   taxation	   and	   social	   conflict	   in	  
Switzerland	  by	  Tanner	  (1994)	  concluded	  that	  a	  state’s	  budget	  reveals	  the	  true	  structures	  about	  who	  
is	   in	   power	   and	   decides.	   Tanner	   (1994:124)	   described	   the	   budget	   as	   the	   state’s	   skeleton	   beyond	  
cheap	   talk.	   Correspondingly	   the	   structure	   or	   the	   state’s	   activities	   cannot	   differ	   heavily	   from	   its	  
budget.	  
Previous	  studies	   in	  the	  pledge	  fulfilment	  literature	  (for	  the	  case	  of	  Switzerland:	  Schwarz	  et	  al.	  2010	  
and	  Fivaz	  et	  al.	  2014)	  usually	  compare	  specific,	  single-­‐issue	  related	  pre-­‐electoral	  pledges	  with	  post-­‐
electoral	   behaviour.	   In	   contrast	   to	   the	   often-­‐heard	   public	   complaint	   about	   dishonest	   politicians	  
recent	  studies	  uphold	  a	  surprisingly	  positive	  picture	  regarding	  pledge	  fulfilment	  (e.g.	  Mansergh	  and	  
Thomson	  2007,	  Louwerse	  2011	  and	  2012)	  that	  is	  confirmed	  in	  the	  Swiss	  case	  by	  Schwarz	  et	  al.	  (2010)	  
and	   Fivaz	   et	   al.	   (2014).	   They	   found	   that	   in	   roughly	   85%	   of	   the	   cases	   MPs	   acted	   in	   parliament	  
according	  to	  their	  pre-­‐electoral	  pledges.	  	  
Despite	  these	  encouraging	  results	  for	  representational	  democracy	  in	  terms	  of	  mandate	  fulfilment,	  it	  
appears	  beneficiary	  for	  several	  reasons	  to	  challenge	  them	  with	  an	  alternative	  approach.	  
The	   first	   reason	   is	   the	   very	   specific	   and	   narrow	   definition	   of	   pre-­‐electoral	   pledges.	   No	   matter	  
whether	   party	   manifestos	   or,	   like	   increasingly	   in	   more	   recent	   papers,	   Voting	   Advice	   Applications	  
(VAA)1	  have	  been	  used	  as	  data	   source	   to	  determine	   the	   content	  of	   pre-­‐election	  pledges,	   the	  basic	  
concept	  was	  to	  find	  exact	  matches	  between	  pre-­‐election	  statements	  and	  legislative	  decisions.	  In	  the	  
Swiss	   case	   only	   34	   out	   of	   75	   smartvote	   questions	   could	   be	   used	   for	   the	   analysis	   for	   the	   rest	   no	  
matching	  legislative	  vote	  could	  be	  found.	  
Thus	   Fivaz	  et	   al.	   (2014)	   in	   their	   conclusions	   suggested	  an	  alternative	  way	  which	  would	  define	  pre-­‐
election	  promises	  in	  a	  more	  general	  and	  latent	  manner	  by	  aggregating	  all	  VAA	  statements	  belonging	  
to	  a	   certain	  policy	  area	   into	  a	  general	   ideological	  position	  concerning	   this	  policy	  area	  which	   is	   less	  
amenable	   to	   the	   specifities	   and	   circumstances	   of	   singe-­‐issue	   questions	   (e.g.	   “a	   general	   position	   in	  
favour	  of	  environmental	  protection”	  instead	  of	  “in	  favour	  of	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  2%	  energy	  tax	  by	  
2018”).	   The	   idea	   of	   this	   alternative	   is	   to	  measure	   the	   level	   of	   kept	   promises	   on	   grounds	   of	   entire	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  VAAs	  are	  websites,	  which	  provide	  voters	  with	  the	  possibility	  to	  compare	  their	  own	  views	  on	  policy	  issues	  with	  
those	  of	  parties	  or	  cand	  idates.	  For	  further	  information	  see	  the	  edited	  volume	  by	  Garzia	  and	  Marschall	  (2014)	  
or	  Ladner	  et	  al.	  2010	  as	  well	  as	  Ladner	  and	  Fivaz	  2012.	  All	  over	  Europe	  and	  especially	  in	  Switzerland	  VAAs	  have	  
become	  very	  popular.	  In	  the	  Swiss	  2011	  national	  elections	  almost	  every	  sixth	  voter	  used	  the	  services	  provided	  
by	  smartvote	  (Ladner	  et	  al.	  2012	  and	  Pianzola	  2014).	  Therefore	  it	  does	  not	  come	  to	  a	  surprise	  that	  also	  a	  large	  
number	  of	  candidates	  answered	  the	  smartvote	  questionnaire	  in	  order	  to	  be	  present	  with	  their	  own	  political	  
profile	  on	  the	  website	  (85%	  of	  the	  candidates	  and	  over	  90%	  of	  the	  elected	  MPs	  in	  2011),	  which	  makes	  it	  very	  
tempting	  to	  use	  smartvote	  VAA	  data	  for	  scientific	  purposes.	  For	  a	  smartvote	  version	  in	  English	  see	  
www.smartvote.ch/11_ch_nr/election/index?lang=en_GB.	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policy	  areas	  and	  not	  on	  grounds	  of	   very	   specific	   and	  often	   technical	   issues	  which	  would	  move	   the	  
analysis	  closer	  to	  how	  voters	  see	  and	  interpret	  politics	  (Fivaz	  et	  al	  2014).	  
Basically	   there	   are	   two	   ways	   how	   to	   implement	   this	   alternative	   approach.	   One	   possibility	   is	   to	  
identify	  among	  the	  answers	  to	  all	  VAA	  statements	  a	  number	  of	  relevant	  policy	  areas	  by	  conducting	  
any	  kind	  of	  clustering	  or	  scaling	  method.	  However,	  this	  paper	  follows	  a	  second	  path.	  
The	   smartvote	   questionnaire	   for	   the	   elections	   in	   2007	   and	   2011	   included	   beside	   specific	   issue	  
questions	   also	   eleven	   more	   general	   questions	   on	   the	   federal	   budget	   asking	   how	   the	   candidates	  
would	   set	   the	   financial	   priorities	   in	   these	   areas	   (e.g.	   “Would	   you	   spend	   less,	   more	   or	   the	   same	  
amount	   of	   money	   for	   national	   defence?”).	   Previous	   studies	   regularly	   neglected	   these	   questions	  
because	   they	  did	  not	   fit	   into	   a	   standard	   research	  design.	   In	   this	   paper	  we	  will	   partly	   replicate	   the	  
aforementioned	   studies	  by	  Schwarz	  et	   al.	   (2010)	  and	  Fivaz	  et	   al.	   (2014)	  by	  using	  budget	  questions	  
instead	  of	  the	  specific	   issue	  questions	   in	  order	  to	  compare	  pre-­‐electoral	  pledges	  and	  post-­‐electoral	  
legislative	  behaviour.	  
The	  research	  design	  and	  the	  applied	  statistical	  methods	  are	  based	  on	  these	  former	  studies.	  However,	  
instead	  of	  preferences	  on	  very	  specific	  issues	  (e.g.	  the	  protection	  of	  endangered	  animals	  like	  wolves	  
or	  bears)	  we	  use	  in	  this	  paper	  more	  general	  preferences	  on	  public	  spending	  for	  a	  number	  of	  policy	  
fields	   (e.g.	   the	  public	  spending	   in	   favour	  of	  environmental	  protection)	  as	   implicit	  pledges.	  The	   idea	  
behind	   is	   to	   test	  whether	  budget	  preferences	  could	  be	  used	  as	  an	  alternative	   to	   the	   typically	  used	  
issue	  preferences.	  If	  we	  can	  deliver	  plausible	  results	  this	  approach	  would	  open	  new	  perspectives	  for	  
research	  on	  the	  fulfilment	  of	  the	  party	  mandate.	  
Before	  we	  address	  both	   the	   research	  design	   and	   the	  data	   (section	  3),	  we	  provide	   in	   the	   following	  
section	   some	  basic	   insights	   into	   the	  budget	  and	   fiscal	  policy	   in	   Switzerland.	   Section	  4	   contains	   the	  
analysis	   as	   well	   as	   the	   presentation	   of	   the	   results.	   The	   discussion	   of	   the	   results	   as	   well	   as	   the	  
conclusions	  follow	  in	  section	  5.	  
	  
2.	  Economic	  development	  and	  fiscal	  policy	  in	  Switzerland	  
In	  retrospect,	  and	  particularly	  compared	  to	  countries	  like	  Spain,	  France,	  Italy,	  Portugal	  and	  others,	  
Switzerland	  has	  overcome	  the	  banking	  and	  financial	  crisis	  since	  2008	  without	  any	  larger	  difficulties.	  
Table	  1	  contains	  important	  key	  figures	  concerning	  the	  Swiss	  economy	  and	  the	  federal	  budget	  since	  
2007.	  The	  Swiss	  economy	  began	  to	  feel	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  crisis	  in	  late	  2008	  resulting	  in	  a	  decrease	  of	  
economic	  growth	  from	  3.8%	  to	  2.2%,	  but	  only	  in	  2009	  resulted	  a	  negative	  growth.	  Unemployment	  
reacted	  with	  a	  certain	  time	  lag	  to	  the	  crisis	  and	  reached	  its	  peak	  in	  2010.	  To	  sum	  up,	  the	  crisis’	  overall	  
impact	  resulted	  in	  clearly	  weaker	  economic	  growth	  but	  Switzerland	  did	  not	  undergo	  a	  real	  economic	  
depression	  like	  other	  hard-­‐hit	  countries.	  In	  the	  end	  the	  Swiss	  economy	  recovered	  quickly.	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Table	  1:	  Fundamental	  key	  data	  for	  the	  Swiss	  economy	  and	  the	  federal	  budget	  (2007-­‐2012)	  
	   2007	   2008	   2009	   2010	   2011	   2012	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Swiss	  economy	  fundamentals	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
GDP	  (in	  billion	  CHF)	   540.8	  	   567.9	  	   554.4	  	   572.7	  	   585.1	  	   591.9	  	  
GDP	  growth	  (in	  %)	   3.8	  	   2.2	  	   -­‐1.9	  	   3.0	  	   1.8	  	   1.0	  	  
Unemployment	  rate	  (in%)	   3.7	  	   3.4	  	   4.3	  	   4.5	  	   4.0	  	   4.2	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Federal	  budget	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Spending	  (in	  billion	  CHF)	   62.2	  	   64.1	  	   58.7	  	   60.0	  	   64.1	  	   62.2	  	  
Revenues	  (in	  billion	  CHF)	   58.7	  	   64.2	  	   68.1	  	   62.9	  	   64.7	  	   63.8	  	  
Surplus	  (in	  billion	  CHF)	   -­‐3.4	  	   0.1	  	   9.4	  	   2.9	  	   0.6	  	   1.6	  	  
Government	  debt	  (in	  %	  of	  GDP)	   41.8	  	   39.2	  	   37.7	  	   36.4	  	   35.5	  	   36.4	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Notes:	  Unemployment	  rate	  according	  to	  ILO	  standards;	  Government	  debt	  according	  to	  Maastricht	  criteria.	  
Source:	  Swiss	  Federal	  Statistical	  Office	  (www.bfs.admin.ch)	  
This	  on	  the	  whole	  positive	  picture	  of	  the	  economic	  development	  is	  mirrored	  in	  the	  development	  of	  
the	   federal	   budget.	   Since	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   financial	   crisis	   the	   federal	   budget	   ended	   up	  with	   a	  
surplus	   between	   0.1	   and	   9.4	   billion	   Swiss	   Francs	   in	   each	   year.	   It	  was	   even	   possible	   to	   reduce	   the	  
government	  debt	  measured	  in	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  GDP	  during	  the	  crisis.	  In	  the	  eyes	  of	  foreign	  observers	  
this	  might	  well	   look	   like	  Switzerland	  was	  not	   touched	  by	   the	  crisis	  at	  all,	  which	  with	   the	  benefit	  of	  
hindsight	  is	  corroborated	  by	  the	  financial	  key	  figures	  presented	  above.	  But	  in	  the	  public	  discourse	  on	  
governmental	  spending	  at	  that	  time	  the	  crisis	  was	  ubiquitous	  because	  of	  the	  profound	   insecurity	   it	  
caused	  about	  what	  more	  was	  to	  come.	  
The	  healthy	  state	  of	  the	  federal	  budget	  is	  not	  only	  a	  result	  of	  the	  very	  positive	  general	  development	  
of	  the	  country’s	  economy	  (e.g.	   tax	  revenues	  were	  hardly	  affected	  by	  the	  crisis).	  A	  further	  reason	   is	  
that	  both	  the	  government	  and	  the	  parliament	  traditionally	  insist	  on	  a	  rather	  cautious	  spending	  policy	  
whenever	  the	  topic	  comes	  up	  (e.g.	  like	  other	  countries	  Switzerland	  also	  had	  a	  “stimulus	  package”	  to	  
support	   the	   economy	   in	   2010,	   but	   it	   was	   a	   very	   limited	   one).	   This	   cautious	   spending	   policy	   is	  
consequential	  to	  the	  prevailing	  ideology	  of	  the	  centre	  and	  right	  wing	  parties,	  which	  have	  a	  persistent	  
majority	   in	   the	   Swiss	   parliament.	   But	   most	   importantly,	   the	   institutional	   rules	   of	   budgetary	  
accounting	  have	  to	  be	  taken	  into	  account.	  
Several	  instruments	  and	  regulations	  concerning	  the	  budget-­‐making	  process	  are	  designed	  in	  a	  way	  to	  
have	  a	  moderating	  effect	  on	  government	  spending.	  Among	  these	  mandatory	  procedures,	  which	  are	  
often	  very	  technical	  and	  complicated	  to	  outsiders,	  two	  stand	  out	  and	  are	  exemplified.	  First,	  the	  so-­‐
called	   “spending	   brake”	   (“Ausgabenbremse”)	   demands	   that	   all	   subsidies	   above	   20	  million	   CHF	   for	  
non-­‐recurring	   and	   above	   2	   million	   CHF	   for	   annual	   expenditures	   need	   the	   approval	   of	   a	   qualified	  
majority	  in	  both	  chambers	  of	  the	  parliament.	  Second,	  the	  so-­‐called	  “debt	  brake”	  is	  laid	  down	  in	  the	  
constitution	   and	   requires	   from	   both	   the	   government	   and	   the	   parliament	   to	   spend	   only	   as	   much	  
money	  as	  is	  available	  from	  tax	  revenues.	  The	  regulations	  allow	  deficit	  spending	  only	  on	  a	  very	  small	  
scale	  and	  only	  contingent	  on	  the	  overall	  economic	  situation.	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3.	  Data	  and	  research	  design	  
Our	  main	  focus	  is	  to	  explain	  incongruence	  between	  the	  pledges	  made	  during	  election	  campaigns	  and	  
the	  voting	  behaviour	  in	  parliament.	  Incongruence	  is	  measured	  at	  MP	  level.	  We	  look	  at	  individual	  pre-­‐
electoral	  statements	  and	  compare	  them	  to	  the	  positions	  taken	  in	  legislative	  votes.	  
For	   the	   pre-­‐electoral	   statements	  we	   use	   data	   form	   the	   2007	   and	   2011	   versions	   of	   the	   Swiss	   VAA	  
smartvote.	  The	  2007	  smartvote	  version	  contained	  73	  questions	  in	  total,	  10	  of	  which	  enquired	  about	  
specific	   items	   of	   Switzerland's	   federal	   budget,	   whereas	   the	   2011	   smartvote	   version	   contained	   11	  
questions	  out	  of	  75	  dealing	  with	  preferences	  on	  the	  federal	  budget	  (for	  details	  see	  Appendix	  1).	  
We	  compared	  these	  pre-­‐electoral	  budget	  preferences	  with	  the	  individual	  parliamentary	  votes	  in	  the	  
first	   budget	   debate	   following	   the	   elections.	   Swiss	   elections	   always	   take	   place	   in	   October,	   budget	  
debates	  in	  December.	  In	  both	  of	  this	  paper’s	  relevant	  reference	  studies	  (Schwarz	  et	  al.	  2010;	  Fivaz	  et	  
al.	  2014)	  the	  date	  of	   included	  parliamentary	  votes	  was	  one	  of	  the	  explanatory	  variables	  because	  as	  
time	  goes	  by	  pre-­‐election	  positions	   are	   sometimes	  overtaken	  by	  events.	   The	   longer	   the	   time	   span	  
between	   the	   VAA	   statement	   and	   the	   legislative	   vote,	   the	   higher	   the	   propensity	   that	   conditions	  
change,	  and	  with	  them	  the	  positions	  taken	  by	  MPs.	  In	  the	  paper	  at	  hand	  the	  time	  span	  between	  the	  
VAA	  statement	  and	  the	  budget	  debates	  is	  very	  short,	  only	  2	  months,	  and	  also	  the	  same	  for	  all	  votes.	  
There	  is	  therefore	  no	  need	  for	  this	  variable.	  However,	  we	  kept	  a	  time	  variable	  in	  our	  models	  because	  
we	  included	  two	  budget	  debates	  into	  our	  analysis:	  one	  took	  place	  before	  the	  2008	  outbreak	  of	  the	  
financial	  crisis	  and	  one	  afterwards.	  This	  time	  variable	  is	  used	  to	  analyse	  the	  potential	   impact	  of	  the	  
financial	  crisis	  on	  pledge	  fulfilment.	  
In	  total	  we	  found	  38	  votes	  in	  the	  2007	  and	  2011	  budget	  debates,	  which	  match	  the	  VAA	  budget	  items	  
(see	  full	  list	  in	  Appendix	  2).	  Focussing	  only	  on	  budget	  debates	  implies	  an	  important	  restriction.	  There	  
are	   two	  kinds	  of	   expenditures	   in	   the	   federal	   budget:	   discretionary	   (unbound	  or	   free)	   expenditures	  
and	   expenditures	   bound	   to	   a	   specific	   legal	   act	   that	   differs	   from	   the	   annual	   budget	   act.	   E.g.,	   large	  
parts	   of	   welfare	   state	   expenditures	   are	   regulated	   in	   specific	   acts	   on	   retirement	   provisions	   or	  
unemployment	   insurance.	   Within	   the	   budget	   debates	   MPs	   can	   only	   decide	   about	   discretionary	  
expenditures.	  If	  they	  intend	  to	  adapt	  expenditures	  appropriated	  by	  a	  specific	  act	  they	  have	  to	  initiate	  
a	  revision	  of	  this	  act.	  Therefore	  focussing	  on	  budget	  debates	  is	  responsible	  for	  the	  limited	  number	  of	  
policy	  areas	  included	  into	  our	  analysis	  (see	  Appendix	  1	  and	  2).	  
	  
Dependent	  variable	  
The	   dependent	   variable	   is	   a	   binary	   congruence	  measure	   for	   every	  matching	   pair	   of	   VAA	   item	   and	  
parliamentary	  vote:	  it	  is	  1	  if	  the	  voting	  behaviour	  matches	  the	  VAA	  answer	  (positional	  congruence),	  
otherwise	  it	  is	  0	  (positional	  incongruence).	  The	  set	  of	  available	  answer	  options	  in	  the	  VAA	  survey	  and	  
in	  parliamentary	  votes	   is	  not	   identical,	  however.	   In	   the	  2007	  smartvote	  version	   the	   three	  available	  
options	   were:	   spend	   more,	   spend	   the	   same,	   spend	   less.	   The	   2011	   version	   featured	   five	   options,	  
adding:	  spend	  considerably	  more	  and	  spend	  considerably	   less	  to	  the	  set	   in	  2007.	  For	  this	  paper	  we	  
adjusted	  the	  2011	  version	  to	  the	  three-­‐option	  set	  according	  to	  the	  2007	  smartvote	  version.	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MPs	  are	  given	  three	  voting	  options	  in	  parliament:	  yes,	  no,	  abstention.	  In	  budgetary	  votes,	  depending	  
on	   how	   the	   specific	   proposal	   is	   formulated,	   the	   available	   yes/no	   option	   equals	   to	   either	   of	   the	  
following	  two	  pairs	  of	  opposites:	  
1. Spend	  less	  vs.	  spend	  not	  less	  (=	  spend	  the	  same	  or	  more).	  
2. Spend	  more	  vs.	  spend	  not	  more	  (=	  spend	  the	  same	  or	  less).	  
In	  our	  analysis	  we	  took	  care	  that	  VAA	  answers	  are	  correctly	  matched	  with	  parliamentary	  votes.	  That	  
is,	   in	   a	   first	   step	  we	   investigated	   for	   every	   budget	   vote	   the	  meaning	   of	   'yes'	   and	   'no',	   and	   how	   it	  
matched	  with	   the	   smartvote	   answer	   options	   (see	   Appendix	   2).	   Abstentions	   are	   always	   treated	   as	  
incongruent	  behaviour,	  absenteeism	  in	  legislative	  votes	  as	  missing	  values.	  
	  
Explanatory	  variables	  
In	  our	  analytical	  model	  we	  include	  the	  following	  explanatory	  variables:	  
Positional	  centrality	  of	  a	  party:	  Parties	  at	  both	  ends	  on	  the	  common	  left-­‐right	  scale	  are	  more	  extreme	  
in	   their	   standpoints	   (which	   is	   basically	  why	   they	   are	   located	   there),	  more	   ideology-­‐driven	  and	   less	  
willing	   to	   compromise	  with	   others.	   In	   contrast,	   parties	  more	   to	   the	   centre	   of	   the	   political	   system	  
usually	   hold	   less	   stubborn	   views	   and	   thus	   are	   welcome	   partners	   in	   legislative	   alliances.	   We	  
hypothesise	   that	   the	  more	  extreme	  (the	   less	  central)	   the	  party	  position	   is,	   the	  higher	   its	  positional	  
congruence.	   We	   use	   the	   average	   party	   success	   rates	   in	   parliamentary	   votes	   to	   measure	   the	  
positional	  centrality	  of	  a	  party	  (i.e.,	  the	  higher	  the	  success	  rate	  the	  more	  central).	  
As	  an	  alternative	  to	  the	  positional	  centrality	  variable,	  we	  employ	  party	  dummies	  in	  order	  to	  estimate	  
the	  effect	  of	   individual	  parties	  on	  the	  dependent	  variable	  (reference	  category	  =	  moderate	  Christian	  
Democrats).	  The	  inclusion	  of	  party	  dummies	  requires	  dropping	  party	  random	  effects	  levels.	  
Legislature:	  Our	  data	  stem	  from	  two	  distinct	  periods	  of	  time.	   In	  2007	  there	  were	  no	  real	  signs	  of	  a	  
financial	  crisis,	  at	  least	  it	  was	  not	  a	  topic	  in	  political	  circles.	  VAA	  answers	  and	  the	  subsequent	  budget	  
debate	  were	  unaffected	  by	  any	  symptoms	  of	  crisis.	  The	  picture	  had	  changed	  by	  2011	  when	  banking,	  
currency	   and	   financial	   crises	   were	   in	   full	   swing	   and	   in	   some	   countries	   reached	   levels	   of	   political	  
turmoil.	  The	  variable	  captures	  the	  political	  context	  that	  had	  changed	  over	  time,	  especially	  regarding	  
the	  financial	  outlook	  on	  the	  European	  continent.	  	  
Positional	   incongruence	  with	  party	  group	  majority:	  Positional	  congruence	  by	  an	  MP	  is	  more	  likely	   if	  
the	  party	  group	  takes	  up	  the	  same	  stance	  on	  the	  issue.	  If	  an	  MP	  finds	  out	  after	  the	  election	  that	  the	  
majority	  of	  her	  fellow	  party	  members	  take	  another	  position	  there	  should	  be	  an	  increased	  propensity	  
that	  she	  will	  eventually	  conform	  to	  the	  majority	  position	  due	  to	  peer	  pressure.	  This	  variable	  is	  binary,	  
analogically	  defined	  to	  the	  dependent	  variable.	  
District	  magnitude:	   Voting	   theory	   suggests	   that	   the	   electoral	   connection	   is	   closer	   in	   small	   districts	  
because	  a	  lower	  number	  of	  MPs	  makes	  it	  easier	  to	  keep	  track	  of	  their	  legislative	  behaviour	  (Bowler	  
and	  Farrel	  1993;	  Carey	  and	  Shugart	  1995;	  Cox	  1997).	  We	  therefore	  expect	  that	  pre-­‐election	  positions	  
are	  more	   likely	   to	  be	  disregarded	   in	   larger	  districts.	   Because	  district	  magnitude	   is	   not	   expected	   to	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show	  a	  linear	  effect,	  we	  use	  two	  dummy	  variables	  which	  capture	  the	  smallest	  districts	  with	  up	  to	  4	  
seats	  and	  the	  largest	  ones	  with	  15	  or	  more	  seats	  (reference	  category	  =	  medium-­‐sized	  districts).	  
Incumbency:	   The	   effect	   of	   incumbency	   on	   pledge	   fulfilment	   is	   theoretically	   ambiguous:	   Unlike	  
freshmen,	   incumbents	  are	  more	  consolidated	   in	   their	  political	  positions.	  But	   incumbents	  also	  have	  
gained	  self-­‐confidence	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  have	  been	  constantly	  re-­‐elected,	  which	  could	  weaken	  
the	  chain	  of	  delegation	  and	  broaden	  political	  leeway	  (Shugart	  et	  al.	  2005;	  Tavits	  2009).	  
Control	   variables:	   Moreover,	   we	   control	   for	   language	   (French-­‐	   and	   Italian-­‐speaking	   minorities	   vs.	  
German-­‐speaking	  majority),	  as	  well	  as	  MPs'	  age	  and	  sex.	  
	  
Research	  method	  
Given	  the	  clustered	  structure	  of	  the	  data,	  we	  ran	  a	  number	  of	  mixed-­‐effects	  (multilevel)	  regression	  
models	   to	   explain	   positional	   (in-­‐)congruence.	   The	   hierarchical	   data	   structure	   features	   four	   levels:	  
individual	  MP,	  electoral	  district	   (canton),	  national	  party,	  and	  the	  single	  vote/issue.	  These	   levels	  are	  
not	  perfectly	  nested,	  the	  model	  specification	  thus	  has	  to	  deal	  with	  cross-­‐classification	  (e.g.	  national	  
parties	  appear	   in	  different	  cantons	  and	  every	  MP	  gives	  his	  or	  her	  opinion	  on	  a	  number	  of	  different	  
votes).	   The	   cross-­‐classification	   structure	   is	   simplified	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   'empty	   model'	   estimations	  
containing	  only	  random	  effects	  indicated	  that	  the	  contribution	  to	  the	  explained	  variance	  by	  the	  level	  
of	  cantons	  is	  extremely	  small	  (results	  not	  reported	  here).	  We	  therefore	  dropped	  cross-­‐classifications	  
involving	  parties	  and	  cantons,	  but	  leaving	  those	  between	  votes/issues	  and	  MPs/parties.	  
	  
4.	  Analysis	  and	  results	  
Table	  2	  lists	  the	  average	  positional	  congruence	  of	  Swiss	  MPs	  by	  party	  and	  compares	  it	  to	  the	  figures	  
according	   to	   Fivaz	   et	   al.	   (2014:	   208).	   Overall	   congruent	   behaviour	   is	   80.2%,	   which	   means	   that	  
legislative	   voting	   is	   in	   agreement	   with	   VAA	   statements	   in	   8	   out	   of	   10	   cases.	   Interesting	   is	   the	  
comparison	  with	   the	   study	   recently	   published	  by	   Fivaz	   et	   al.:	   there	   the	   authors	   found	   the	   general	  
pattern	   that	  more	  extreme	  parties	   show	  higher	  congruence	   rates.	  The	  present	  paper	  confirms	   this	  
for	   the	   two	   leftist	   parties	   SP	   and	  GPS,	   but	   not	   so	   for	   rightist	   SVP	  whose	   congruence	   rate	   plunged	  
from	  almost	  87	  to	  74%.	  The	  comparison	  also	  reveals	  that	  all	  parties,	  except	  the	  FDP,	  show	  somewhat	  
lower	  congruence	  figures	  in	  the	  present	  budget	  study.	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Table	  2:	  Congruence	  of	  MP	  positions	  (averages	  by	  party)	  
	   	  
Congruent	  behaviour	  (N)	  
Fivaz	  et	  al.	  2014:208	  
Congruent	  behaviour	  (N)	  
	   	   	  
CVP	   73.6%	  (977)	   75.8%	  (736)	  
FDP	   80.4%	  (902)	   80.3%	  (704)	  
GPS	   91.5%	  (689)	   93.7%	  (474)	  
SP	   89.6%	  (1,405)	   93,4%	  (1,301)	  
SVP	   74.2%	  (1,657)	   86.6%	  (1,243)	  
	   	   	  
Other	  (small	  parties)	   70.6%	  (473)	   82.9%	  (342)	  
	   	   	  
All	  MPs	   80.2%	  (6,103)	   86.3%	  (4,800)	  
	   	   	  
Notes:	   CVP	   =	   Christian	   Democrats	   (centrist),	   FDP	   =	   Liberals	   (centre-­‐right),	   GPS	   =	   Greens	   (left),	   SP	   =	   Social	  
Democrats	  (left),	  SVP	  =	  Swiss	  People’s	  Party	  /	  Conservative	  (right).	  
Like	  in	  both	  reference	  studies	  (Schwarz	  et	  al.	  2010;	  Fivaz	  et	  al.2014)	  ideological	  and	  organisational	  
aspects	  of	  parties	  seem	  to	  account	  for	  some	  variation	  in	  positional	  congruence	  in	  the	  present	  budget	  
study	  as	  well.	  For	  an	  in-­‐depth	  analysis	  of	  the	  possible	  driving	  factors	  we	  ran	  two	  statistical	  models	  to	  
predict	  positional	  congruence	  between	  VAA	  positions	  and	  voting	  behaviour	  in	  parliament	  (Table	  3).	  
The	  models	  only	  differ	  in	  the	  way	  they	  capture	  the	  party	  effects	  (random	  level	  vs.	  dummy	  fixed	  
effects).	  
The	  estimations	  largely	  confirm	  again	  the	  results	  in	  Schwarz	  et	  al.	  (2010)	  and	  Fivaz	  et	  al.	  (2014):	  By	  
far	  the	  most	  important	  factor	  to	  explain	  positional	  incongruence	  between	  VAA	  answers	  and	  
parliamentary	  voting	  is	  still	  incongruence	  between	  an	  MP’s	  VAA	  answer	  and	  the	  later	  majority	  
position	  in	  her	  legislative	  party	  group.	  The	  logit	  coefficient	  of	  over	  6	  indicates	  that	  the	  odds	  to	  a	  
positional	  change	  are	  almost	  500	  times	  higher	  if	  the	  VAA	  position	  does	  not	  match	  the	  subsequent	  
majority	  position	  in	  the	  party	  group.	  
All	  other	  significant	  factors	  in	  our	  models	  are	  party-­‐related:	  party	  centrality	  (MPs	  from	  pivotal	  parties	  
in	  the	  political	  centre	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  change	  their	  mind)	  in	  the	  first	  model	  and	  its	  replacement	  
party	  dummies	  (higher	  probability	  to	  stick	  to	  the	  pre-­‐election	  attitude	  if	  you	  are	  not	  an	  MP	  of	  the	  
moderate	  Christian	  Democrats)	  in	  the	  second	  model.	  	  
Completely	  gone	  is	  the	  effect	  of	  small	  electoral	  districts,	  which	  gained	  significance	  in	  the	  two	  
forerunner	  studies	  of	  2010	  and	  2014	  (higher	  positional	  congruence	  with	  MPs	  from	  small	  districts).	  
Further	  noteworthy	  is	  the	  non-­‐effect	  of	  the	  political	  context	  of	  the	  financial	  crisis	  in	  Europe,	  which	  is	  
captured	  by	  the	  variable	  “year	  of	  vote”	  (see	  Table	  3),	  with	  the	  2007	  as	  the	  pre-­‐	  and	  the	  2011	  as	  the	  
in-­‐crisis	  budget	  included	  in	  the	  models.	  The	  negative	  coefficients	  indicate	  a	  slight	  decline	  in	  positional	  
congruence	  in	  economically	  insecure	  times,	  but	  the	  effect	  is	  insignificant.	  It	  seems	  that	  party-­‐driven	  
long-­‐term	  ideological	  mind	  sets	  value	  more	  than	  short-­‐term	  insecurities	  in	  the	  political	  context.	  
However,	  Switzerland	  was	  affected	  only	  modestly	  by	  the	  financial	  crisis	  (see	  Table	  1).	  Therefore	  it	  
might	  be	  different	  in	  Countries,	  which	  were	  hit	  harder	  by	  the	  crisis	  and/or	  had	  to	  endure	  an	  
extensive	  downsizing	  of	  government	  spending.	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The	  state	  of	  our	  paper	  is	  preliminary	  for	  which	  reason	  we	  did	  without	  the	  inclusion	  of	  a	  variable	  
capturing	  salience	  of	  budget	  items	  to	  parties	  (strength	  of	  pre-­‐electoral	  preferences	  on	  budgetary	  
issues).	  Based	  on	  the	  experience	  from	  Fivaz	  et	  al.	  (2014)	  we	  can	  expect	  that	  this	  would	  mitigate	  
somewhat	  the	  huge	  effect	  of	  disagreement	  between	  VAA	  statement	  and	  party	  group	  majority.	  
To	  sum	  up,	  positional	  (in-­‐)congruence	  in	  budgetary	  matters	  is	  attributable	  to	  an	  even	  smaller	  number	  
of	  party-­‐related	  factors	  than	  in	  the	  more	  issue-­‐specific,	  non-­‐budgetary	  studies	  by	  Schwarz	  et	  al.	  
(2010)	  and	  Fivaz	  et	  al.	  (2014):	  only	  the	  situation	  in	  the	  own	  party	  group	  after	  the	  election	  and	  
ideological/structural	  aspects	  of	  the	  party	  remain	  significant.	  
	  
Table	  3:	  Logit	  predictions	  for	  positional	  congruence	  between	  pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐election	  sphere.	  Three-­‐
level	  cross-­‐classification	  models	  (MPs,	  parties,	  issues)	  




Fivaz	  et	  al.	  (2014)	  
Model	  3	  
Fivaz	  et	  al.	  (2014)	  
Model	  4	  
	   	   	   	   	  
(Intercept)	   14.81	   15.81	   2.98***	   2.11***	  
	   (11.83)	   (12.26)	   (0.57)	   (0.58)	  
Minority	  language	  (F/I)	   -­‐0.00	   0.01	   0.00	   -­‐0.03	  
	   (0.20)	   (0.20)	   (0.14)	   (0.15)	  
Age	   -­‐0.00	   -­‐0.00	   -­‐0.00	   0.00	  
	   (0.01)	   (0.01)	   (0.01)	   (0.01)	  
Sex:	  male	   -­‐0.12	   -­‐0.12	   -­‐0.05	   0.03	  
	   (0.21)	   (0.21)	   (0.15)	   (0.16)	  
Year	  of	  vote	   -­‐0.20	   -­‐0.25	   0.04	   0.04	  
	   (0.25)	   (0.25)	   (0.06)	   (0.06)	  
Time	  span	  to	  vote	   	   	   -­‐0.01	   -­‐0.01	  
	   	   	   (0.01)	   (0.01)	  
Incumbent	   -­‐0.09	   -­‐0.03	   0.20	   0.20	  
	   (0.19)	   (0.19)	   (0.14)	   (0.15)	  
Relevance	  of	  vote	   	   	   0.02	   0.02	  
	   	   	   (0.24)	   (0.24)	  
District	  seize	  ≤	  4	   0.22	   0.22	   0.51†	   0.51†	  
	   (0.34)	   (0.33)	   (0.26)	   (0.26)	  
District	  seize	  ≥	  15	   -­‐0.10	   -­‐0.10	   -­‐0.10	   -­‐0.13	  
	   (0.19)	   (0.20)	   (0.14)	   (0.14)	  
Preference	  strength	   	   	   1.26***	   1.26***	  
	   	   	   (0.13)	   (0.13)	  
Disagreement	  with	  party	  group	   -­‐6.28***	   -­‐6.28***	   -­‐3.98***	   -­‐3.96***	  
	   (0.19)	   (0.19)	   (0.13)	   (0.13)	  
Core	  issue	   	   	   0.10	   0.12	  
	   	   	   (0.10)	   (0.11)	  
Party	  centrality	   -­‐0.25*	   	   -­‐0.18**	   	  
	   (0.12)	   	   (0.06)	   	  
Party	  FDP	   	   0.73*	   	   0.04	  
	   	   (0.31)	   	   (0.21)	  
Party	  GPS	   	   0.75*	   	   0.71*	  
	   	   (0.37)	   	   (0.31)	  
Party	  SP	   	   1.37***	   	   0.66**	  
	   	   (0.30)	   	   (0.23)	  
Party	  SVP	   	   0.55*	   	   0.15	  
	   	   (0.27)	   	   (0.20)	  
Party	  GLP	   	   1.36**	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Fivaz	  et	  al.	  (2014)	  
Model	  3	  
Fivaz	  et	  al.	  (2014)	  
Model	  4	  
	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   (0.51)	   	   	  
Party	  small	   	   0.11	   	   -­‐0.07	  
	   	   (0.40)	   	   (0.28)	  
	   	   	   	   	  
Log	  Likelihood	   -­‐1,004	   -­‐999	   -­‐966	   -­‐962	  
Num.	  obs.	   6,085	   	   4,744	   4,744	  
Num.	  groups:	  MP	   265	   265	   250	   250	  
Num.	  groups:	  Party	   13	   	   12	   	  
Num.	  groups:	  Issue	   38	   38	   34	   34	  
Variance:	  MP	  (Intercept)	   0.76	   0.73	   0.07	   0.06	  
Variance:	  Party	  (Intercept)	   0.11	   	   0.00	   	  
Variance:	  Issue	  (Intercept)	   0.28	   0.27	   0.19	   0.17	  
	   	   	   	   	  
Notes:	  ***p	  <	  0.001,	  **p	  <	  0.01,	  *p	  <	  0.05,	  †p	  <	  0.1	  (Standard	  errors	  in	  brackets).	  
CVP	  =	  Christian	  Democrats	  (centrist),	  FDP	  =	  Liberals	  (centre-­‐right),	  GLP	  =	  Green-­‐Liberals	  (centrist),	  GPS	  =	  Greens	  
(left),	  SP	  =	  Social	  Democrats	  (left),	  SVP	  =	  Swiss	  People’s	  Party	  /	  Conservative	  (right).	  
 
5.	  Conclusions	  
The	  paper	  presents	  a	  replication	  of	  recent	  studies	  on	  pledge	  fulfilment	  by	  Swiss	  MPs	  (Schwarz	  et	  al.	  
2010	  and	  Fivaz	  et	   al.	   2014).	   The	   same	   research	  design	  and	   statistical	  method	   like	   in	   the	   reference	  
studies	  are	  applied,	  with	  the	  notable	  exception	  that	  the	  present	  paper	  uses	  pre-­‐electoral	  statements	  
on	   budget	  matters	   for	   the	   comparison	  with	   parliamentary	   votes	  while	   previous	   studies	   compared	  
statements	  on	  specific	  single	  issues	  with	  votes	  on	  identical	  issues	  in	  parliament.	  This	  exhibits,	  to	  our	  
knowledge,	  a	  new	  approach	  in	  the	  mandate	  fulfilment	  literature.	  
This	   is	   a	   preliminary	  paper	  with	   an	  explorative	   setting	  particularly	  with	   regard	   to	   the	  used	  budget	  
data.	  Thus	  the	  following	  conclusions	  do	  not	  only	  discuss	  the	  empirical	  results	  but	  also	  the	  potential	  
of	  the	  budgetary	  perspective	  for	  our	  field	  of	  research.	  
The	  empirical	  results	  mainly	  offer	  a	  confirmation	  of	  the	  aforementioned	  2010	  and	  2014	  studies.	  This	  
is	   in	   three	  ways	   good	  news:	   First,	   because	   it	   corroborates	   the	   findings	  of	   our	  previous	  work	  using	  
different	   data	   sources.	   Second,	   because	   it	   confirms	   that	   the	   use	   of	   pre-­‐election	   pledges	   based	   on	  
budget	  statements	  lead	  to	  very	  similar	  results	  like	  the	  use	  of	  conventional	  VAA	  statements.	  We	  see	  
no	  reason	  why	  budget	  statements	  should	  not	  be	  used	  for	  mandate	  fulfilment	  research.	  And	  third,	  it	  
refutes	  once	  more	  the	  notorious	  picture	  of	  constantly	  lying	  MPs.	  
A	   closer	   look	   at	   the	   results	   reveals	   interesting	   differences,	   though:	   	   For	   instance,	   the	   significant	  
impact	   of	   the	  district	   seize	  has	   vanished.	   Following	   Stratmann	  and	  Bauer	   (2002)	   and	   Edwards	   and	  
Thames	   (2007)	   the	   specific	   shape	   of	   electoral	   systems	   has	   an	   impact	   on	  MPs’	   legislative	   activities	  
(e.g.	  committee	  membership,	  voting	  behaviour	  concerning	  government	  spending	  or	  support	  of	  pork-­‐
barrel).	  According	  to	  their	  studies	  more	   important	  than	  district	  size	   is	  the	  election	  type	  (candidate-­‐
oriented	  first-­‐past-­‐the-­‐post	  or	  party-­‐oriented	  systems	  of	  proportional	  representation).	   	  Because	  we	  
did	  not	   include	  Switzerland’s	  second	  chamber	  (Council	  of	  States),	  whose	  members	  are	  elected	  by	  a	  
different	   electoral	   system	   than	   those	   of	   the	   first	   chamber,	   into	   our	   analysis,	   we	   cannot	   present	  
evidence	  about	   the	   impact	  of	   the	  election	   type.	  However,	   future	   research	  –	  especially	   in	  countries	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with	  mixed	  electoral	  systems	  like	  Germany,	  New	  Zealand	  or	  Switzerland	  –	  should	  pay	  more	  attention	  
to	  potential	  effects	  of	  different	  electoral	  systems.	  
There	  is,	  of	  course,	  further	  room	  for	   improvement:	  First,	  we	  see	  the	  need	  to	  broaden	  the	  thematic	  
scope	   of	   the	   study	   by	   extending	   the	   selection	   of	   parliamentary	   votes	   to	   expenditures,	   which	   are	  
bound	  by	   a	   specific	   legislative	   act.	   This	  would	   allow	   for	   a	  more	   representative	   picture	  of	   the	   vote	  
selection	   compared	   to	   the	   real	   federal	   budget	   because	   important	   areas	   like	   social	   welfare,	   public	  
transport	  and	   infrastructure	  are	  mostly	   regulated	   in	  separate	  acts.	  Second,	   there	   is	  no	   reason	  why	  
future	  pledge	   fulfilment	   studies	   could	  not	   combine	  budget	  and	   conventional	   issue	   statements	   in	  a	  
common	  model.	  
We	  have	  shown	  the	  potential	  of	  budgetary	  matters	  for	  the	  research	  on	  pledge	  or	  mandate	  fulfilment	  
by	  MPs	   (or	   governments	   as	   a	  whole).	  Whether	   this	   new	  approach	   is	   adaptable	   to	   other	   countries	  
depends	  on	  the	   legislative	  budget-­‐making	  rules.	  The	   lower	  the	  control	  of	  the	  government	  over	  this	  
process	  and	  the	  more	  open	  the	  process	  to	  proposals	  by	  individual	  MPs	  and	  parties	  which	  are	  not	  part	  
of	  the	  government,	  the	  more	  appropriate	  the	  available	  data	  will	  be.	  These	  conditions	  are	  met	  in	  the	  
case	   of	   Switzerland	   for	  which	   reason	   the	   results	   of	   this	   paper	   conform	   so	   nicely	   to	   the	   reference	  
studies.	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Appendix	  1:	  List	  of	  smartvote	  budget	  statements	  2007	  and	  2011	  
smartvote	  2007	   Public	  spending	  according	  to	  previous	  budget	  
	   	  
General	  Question:	  How	  would	  you	  set	  the	  financial	  priorities	  in	  the	  following	  policy	  areas?	  You	  can	  choose	  
between	  the	  following	  alternatives:	  spend	  "considerably	  less",	  "less",	  "the	  same	  amount",	  "more"	  or	  
"considerably	  more".	  
	   	  
2007	   	  
	   	  
1.	  National	  defence	   4.4	  billion	  CHF	  
2.	  Development	  aid	   1.6	  billion	  CHF	  
3.	  Public	  transport	   4.6	  billion	  CHF	  
4.	  Road	  construction	  and	  maintenance	   2.7	  billion	  CHF	  
5.	  Education	  and	  research	   4.0	  billion	  CHF	  
6.	  Subsidies	  for	  culture	  and	  sports	   0.2	  billion	  CHF	  
7.	  Federal	  contributions	  to	  pensions	  (age)	   5.8	  billion	  CHF	  
8.	  Federal	  contributions	  to	  pensions	  (invalidity)	   4.7	  billion	  CHF	  
9.	  Subsidies	  for	  agriculture	   3.8	  billion	  CHF	  
10.	  Environmental	  protection	   0.4	  billion	  CHF	  
	   	  
2011	   	  
	   	  
1.	  Public	  security	  (police/law	  enforcement)	   1.0	  billion	  CHF	  
2.	  National	  defence	   4.9	  billion	  CHF	  
3.	  Development	  aid	   1.9	  billion	  CHF	  
4.	  Public	  transport	   5.2	  billion	  CHF	  
5.	  Road	  construction	  and	  maintenance	   2.7	  billion	  CHF	  
6.	  Environmental	  protection	   1.2	  billion	  CHF	  
7.	  Education	  and	  research	   6.3	  billion	  CHF	  
8.	  Subsidies	  for	  culture	  and	  sports	   0.3	  billion	  CHF	  
9.	  Welfare	  state	  and	  public	  health	  system	   20.4	  billion	  CHF	  
10.	  Subsidies	  for	  agriculture	   3.6	  billion	  CHF	  
11.	  Fiscal	  transfers	  to	  cantons	   3.0	  billion	  CHF	  
	   	  
	  
Appendix	  2:	  List	  of	  parliamentary	  votes	  included	  in	  the	  analysis	  














708	  Office	  fédéral	  de	  
l'agriculture	  A2310.0149	  
Paiements	  directs	  généraux	  
Proposition	  de	  la	  
majorité	  
Proposition	  de	  la	  










Antrag	  der	  Minderheit	  











Antrag	  der	  Minderheit	  





306	  Office	  fédéral	  de	  la	  
culture	  
A2310.Encouragement	  du	  
Proposition	  de	  la	  
majorité	   Proposition	  de	  la	  
minorité	  Pfister	  
not	  less	   less	   culture	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306	  Office	  fédéral	  de	  la	  
culture	  A2310.0320	  Beaux-­‐
arts	  
Proposition	  de	  la	  
majorité	  
Proposition	  de	  la	  
minorité	  Pfister	  





306	  Office	  fédéral	  de	  la	  
culture	  A2310.0321	  Arts	  
appliqués	  
Proposition	  de	  la	  
majorité	  
Proposition	  de	  la	  
minorité	  Pfister	  





303	  Office	  fédéral	  de	  la	  
culture	  A4300.0138	  
Protection	  du	  paysage	  et	  
conservation	  monuments	  
historiques	  
Proposition	  de	  la	  
commission	  
Proposition	  Kiener	  









Antrag	  der	  Minderheit	  




12:52:40	   525	  Défense	  
Proposition	  de	  la	  
majorité	  
Proposition	  de	  la	  
minorité	  Frösch	  
(réduction	  globale	  de	  





525	  Défense	  A2150.0102	  
Equipement	  et	  matériel	  à	  
renouveler	  
Proposition	  de	  la	  
majorité	  
Proposition	  de	  la	  
minorité	  II	  Marti	  





525	  Défense	  A2150.0103	  
Etudes	  de	  projets,	  essais	  et	  
préparatifs	  d'achats	  
Proposition	  de	  la	  
majorité	  
Proposition	  de	  la	  
minorité	  II	  Marti	  





525	  Défense	  V0008.00	  
Etudes	  de	  projets,	  essais	  et	  
préparatifs	  
Proposition	  de	  la	  
majorité	  
Proposition	  de	  la	  





202	  DDC	  A2310.0287	  Actions	  
spéc.	  de	  la	  coop.	  au	  
développement	  
Proposition	  de	  la	  
majorité	  
Proposition	  de	  la	  







202	  DDC	  A2310.0288	  
Contributions	  générales	  à	  des	  
organisations	  internationales	  
Proposition	  de	  la	  
majorité	  
Proposition	  de	  la	  







202	  DDC	  A2310.0288	  
Contributions	  générales	  à	  des	  
organisations	  internationales	  
Proposition	  de	  la	  
majorité	  
Proposition	  de	  la	  







202	  DDC	  Assistance	  
financière	  à	  des	  actions	  
humanitaires	  
Proposition	  de	  la	  
majorité	  
Proposition	  de	  la	  







202	  DDC	  A2310.0295	  Aide	  
aux	  pays	  de	  l'Est	  
Proposition	  de	  la	  
majorité	  
Proposition	  de	  la	  







202	  DDC	  A2310.0295	  Aide	  
aux	  pays	  de	  l'Est	  
Proposition	  de	  la	  
majorité	  
Proposition	  de	  la	  







704	  Secrétariat	  d'Etat	  à	  
l'économie	  A2310.0370	  
Coopération	  économique	  au	  
développement	  
Proposition	  de	  la	  
majorité	  
Proposition	  de	  la	  




704	  Secrétariat	  d'Etat	  à	  
l'économie	  A2310.0446	   Proposition	  de	  la	   Proposition	  de	  la	  
not	  more	   more	  
development	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0101	   10:05:18	   Coopération	  économique	  
avec	  les	  Etats	  d'Europe	  de	  
l'Est	  





EDA	  -­‐	  Direktion	  für	  
Entwicklung	  und	  
Zusammenarbeit	  A2310.0287	  




Antrag	  der	  Minderheit	  














Antrag	  der	  Minderheit	  













Antrag	  der	  Minderheit	  







306	  Office	  fédéral	  de	  la	  
culture	  A2310.0307	  
Encouragement	  de	  l'instruct.	  
de	  jeunes	  Suisses	  de	  
l'étranger	  
Proposition	  de	  la	  
majorité	  
Proposition	  de	  la	  







306	  Office	  fédéral	  de	  la	  
culture	  A2310.0307	  
Encouragement	  de	  l'instruct.	  
de	  jeunes	  Suisses	  de	  
l'étranger	  
Proposition	  de	  la	  
majorité	  
Proposition	  de	  la	  
minorité	  I	  Pfister	  







325	  Secr.	  d'Etat	  à	  l'éducation	  
et	  à	  la	  recherche	  A2310.0193	  
Fondation	  Fonds	  national	  
suisse	  
Proposition	  de	  la	  
majorité	  
Proposition	  de	  la	  
minorité	  Pfister	  







325	  Secr.	  d'Etat	  à	  l'éducation	  
et	  à	  la	  recherche	  A2310.0194	  
Académies	  suisses	  
Proposition	  de	  la	  
majorité	  
Proposition	  de	  la	  
minorité	  Pfister	  







325	  Secr.	  d'Etat	  à	  l'éducation	  
et	  à	  la	  recherche	  A2310.0197	  
Dialogue	  science	  et	  société	  
Proposition	  de	  la	  
majorité	  
Proposition	  de	  la	  
minorité	  Pfister	  







325	  Secr.	  d'Etat	  à	  l'éducation	  
et	  à	  la	  recherche	  A2310.0441	  
Mesures	  d'accompagnement,	  
coop.	  dans	  domaine	  spatial	  
Proposition	  de	  la	  
majorité	  
Proposition	  de	  la	  
minorité	  Pfister	  













Antrag	  der	  Minderheit	  







805	  Office	  fédéral	  de	  
l'énergie	  A2111.0145	  und	  
0146;2310.0222	  
Proposition	  de	  la	  







805	  Office	  fédéral	  de	  
l'énergie	  A4300.0126	  
Proposition	  de	  la	  
majorité	  
Proposition	  de	  la	  




805	  Office	  fédéral	  de	  
l'énergie	  A2111.0145	   Proposition	  de	  la	   Proposition	  de	  la	  
not	  more	   more	  
environmental	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0109	   11:19:46	   Recherche,	  développement	  
et	  démonstration	  





810	  Office	  fédéral	  de	  
l'environnement	  A4300.0105	  
Nature	  et	  paysage	  
Proposition	  de	  la	  
majorité	  
Proposition	  de	  la	  







UVEK	  -­‐	  Bundesamt	  für	  
Energie	  	  A211.0146	  
Programme,	  Energie	  und	  
Abwärmenutzung	  
Antrag	  der	  







806	  Office	  fédéral	  des	  routes	  
A8400.0100	  Attribution	  
annuelle	  au	  fonds	  
d'infrastructure	  
Proposition	  de	  la	  
majorité	  
Proposition	  de	  la	  
minorité	  Pfister	  






16:44:59	   Art.	  1	  let.	  a	  
Proposition	  de	  la	  







EVD	  -­‐	  Bundesgesetz	  über	  die	  




Antrag	  der	  Minderheit	  
Schelbert	   not	  more	   more	   social	  welfare	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